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the books of the corporation.2 7 Further it is settled that a
corporation may refuse to allow investigation of its books by
a stockholder at times when such investigation would un28
reasonably interfere with the management of the business.
The very fact that no expenses of investigation will be allowed unless it is shown to have produced a benefit to the
corporation will discourage unreasonable investigations.
It must be recognized that the present holding will encourage investigations. The requirement that there be benefit to the corporation will be a factor in limiting any abuse
to which the decision may be conducive, even though the determination of whether or not there was a benefit will be a
difficult question in some cases. In view of the practices
in which numerous corporate officials have engaged in the
past,29 the desirability of closer supervision of their activities

more than offsets the slight possibility that it will lead to
burdensome investigations. Traditional concepts of corporate
entity with management by officials rather than stockholders
will not be substantially impaired. Instead, ownership interests will exert a legitimate influence upon those in control to assure a faithful performance of fiduciary duties.

JURIES
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGING OF NEGRO VENIREMEN AS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEGRO
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
Three Negroes were indicted in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia on a charge of murder
in the first degree. Nineteen members of the Negro race
27.

28.

29.

48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78p (a) (1940). This
section makes it mandatory for corporate officials to file monthly
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission in regard
to their transactions in the securities of the corporation. These
reports are public records available for inspection.
Breslauer v. S. Franklin & Co., 205 Ill. App. 372 (1917); Weihenmayer v. Bitner, 88 Md. 325, 42 Atl. 245 (1898); Watkins v.
Donnell Mfg. Co., 129 Mo. App. 206, 107 S. W. 1112 (1908);
Conerty v. Butler County Oil Ref. Co., 301 Pa. 417, 152 Atl. 672
(1930); Kuhback v. Irving Cut Glass Co., 220 Pa. 427, 69 Atl.
981 (1908); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2242 (perm.
ed. 1943).
See Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency on
S. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., and on S. 56 and S. 87, 73d Cong., 1st

and 2d Sess., (1934); Tracy and MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. Rsv. 1025, 1032 (1934).
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appeared on the jury panel. The United States attorney
used nineteen of the twenty peremptory challenges allotted
to the prosecution 1 to reject all nineteen Negroes.
No
other members of the panel were challenged by the prosecution. The Negroes were found guilty and sentenced to death
by the court. Upon appeal, two of the Negroes urged that
the United States attorney had, by peremptorily challenging
the nineteen Negro members of the jury panel, excluded
Negroes from the jury in violation of defendants' rights
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed the convictions, holding that the requirements of
due process were met when there was no racial discrimination in the selection of the panel. Hall v. United States;
Gray v. United States; Harris v. United States, 168 F.2d
161 (App. D. C. 1948).2

Although the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that the right to a mixed jury is not guaranteed to
a Negro defendant by the Constitution or by any act of
Congress, 3 it has uniformly held that systematic discrimnation against Negroes in the selection of a jury panel is a
violation of the rights of a Negro defendant under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
1.
2.

The Civil

Fed. R. Crim. P., 24 (b).
This case has also been noted in 48 COL. L. REv. 953 (1948); 61
HAav. L. REV. 1455 (1948).
3. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (1880). See, e.g., Thomas v.
Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 282 (1909); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316,
321 (1906) ; In re Wood, 140 U. S. 278, 285 (1891) ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 394 (1881).
4. Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128
(1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587
(1935); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U. S. 226 (1904); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370
(1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880).
The Fourteenth Amendment, of course, is not applicable to the
District of Columbia. See Nield et al v. District of Columbia, 110
F.2d 246, 256 (App. D. C. 1940). Although the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the present case, contains no equal
protection clause, it is settled that in the District of Columbia the
Fifth Amendment implies equal protection of laws. O'Connor v.
District of Columbia, 153 F.2d 225 (App. D. C. 1946); Sims v.
Rives, 84 F.2d 871 (App. D. C. 1936). In at least one case arising
outside the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia a federal
court has stated that the Fifth Amendment is broad enough to
include the equal protection which no state may deny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Yount, 267 Fed.
861, 863 (W. D. Pa. 1920). There have also been direct expressions to the effect that the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
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Rights Act has also prohibited the disqualification of citizens
for jury service in federal or state courts because of race
or color. 5 The Federal Government has thus directed that
the jury system shall not be used as a vehicle for racial
discrimination.
On the other hand, the peremptory challenge is a privilege which may be exercised without cause and which the
courts are compelled to allow.6 It may be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously.7
The courts have emphasized the importance of the privilege, and have vigorously protected it against any practice
which might tend to weaken or destroy it.8

Its purpose,

like that of the challenge for cause, is to enable a party to
eliminate from the jury those jurors who he thinks may not
be of sufficient impartiality of mind to give his cause a
fair hearing.
Thus the problem which faced the court was: Admitting
that the peremptory challenge may be arbitrarily exercised,
can it be so used by a United States attorney to exclude a
Negro from a petit jury in a case in which a Negro is on
trial?9 It is the thesis of this note that a result contrary to

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

ment would proscribe discrimination in the selection of the jury
panel. See Wong Yin v. United States, 118 F.2d 667, 669 (C. C.
A. 9th 1941), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 589 (1941). The court in
the present case admits that the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment would be invokable if there had been discrimination
in the selection of the panel. See Hall v. United States; Gray v.
United States; Harris v. United States; 168 F.2d 164 (App. D. C.
1948). It follows that if it can be demonstrated that the instant
conduct would be counted a denial of equal protection in the state
courts, there is no refuting the logic of the defendant's argument
to the effect that he has been denied the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. See also, Fay v. New York,
332 U. S. 261, 284, n.27 (1947).
18 STAT. 336 (1875); 8 U. S. C. § 44 (1946).
1 CHiTT. CRIM. L.* 534. See Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 464
(1880).
4 BL. COMM.* 353; Co. LiTT. *156 b. See Pointer v. United States,
151 U. S. 396, 408 (1894); Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370,
376 (1892); People v. Webster, 362 Ill. 226, 228, 198 N. E. 322,
323 (1935); State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 287, 292 (1856); State v.
Ju Nun, 97 Pac. 96, 98 (Ore. 1908); Commonwealth v. Evans, 61
Atl. 989 (Pa. 1905).
Gulf, Colo. and S. F. Ry. v. Shane, 157 U. S. 348 (1895); Lewis
v. United States, 146 U. S. 370 (1892); Smith v. State, 4 Greene
189 (Iowa 1853); Lamb v. State, 36 Wis. 424 (1874); Schumaker
v. State, 5 Wis. 324 (1856). See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.
S. 396, 408 (1894).
It should be noted that in the instant case, the court did not
expressly deny that discrimination had been practiced. The court's
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the court's was called for, and that a reversal could be
grounded upon either of two reasons. First, regardless of
whether the exclusion would have been constitutional had it
occurred in a state court the reversal could be justified as
an exercise of the supervisory power which inheres in the
courts of the federal system. Second, the reversal could
be justified upon the ground that the conduct of the United
States attorney in the instant case would, if practiced by a
state's attorney, be a denial of the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that
hence it is not to be countenanced in the federal system. 10
It becomes unnecessary to determine whether the United
States attorney's conduct denied the Negro defendants due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment, although it may
be strongly argued that it did."
The obvious basis for a reversal in the instant case is
that the trial court allowed the peremptory challenge to be
used to accomplish a result which contravenes federal policy.
It has been well established that, in the federal system, the
higher courts are charged with the duty of judicial super12
vision of criminal justice in the lower courts of the system.

10.

11.
12.

attitude seems rather to have been that while discrimination is
not to be tolerated in the selection of the panel it may be permissible in other phases of jury formation. "The requirements of
due process were met when there was no racial discrimination
in the selection of the veniremen. The government as a litigant
was entitled to exercise twenty peremptory challenges, which
means that its counsel could exclude from the jury that number
of persons without assigning, or indeed without having, any reason
for doing so. . . . We conclude, therefore, that the appellants'
argument of unconstitutional peremptory challenging is wholly
untenable." Hall v. United States; Gray v. United States; Harris
v. United States, 168 F.2d 161, 164 (App. D. C. 1948).
If past experience is a valid index, the impact of the instant case
will be felt primarily in the state courts, since the problem of
racial discrimination in the process of jury trial has been raised
almost exclusively in cases decided by those courts. In few, if
any, cases has the United States Supreme Court been called upon
to determine the validity of a claim of racial discrimination in
the jury selection system of a federal court. This conclusion is
supported by the abundant cases arising in state courts in which
discrimination against Negroes in the selection of juries has been
involved. These cases are collected in a comprehensive Note
treating the entire problem of unfair practices in the selection
of grand and petit juries, 82 L. Ed. 1053.
The Indiana Supreme Court's vigilance in striking down discriminatory panel selection systems is evidenced by the holding
in the case of Dixon v. State, 224 Ind. 327, 67 N. E.2d 138 (1946).
See note 3 supra.
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187 (1946); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943); Nardone v. United States,
308 U. S. 338 (1939).
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In the exercise of this duty, the United States Supreme Court
has constantly striven to maintain civilized standards of
procedure, which standards are not satisfactorily met by observing the minimal Constitutional safeguards.1 3 An example
of the employment of the supervisory power is to be found
in the case of McNabb v. United States,14 where the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction which it found to have been obtained in disregard of the policy expressed in a federal
statute, regardless of whether it was obtained in accordance
with due process of law. Some notion of the scope of this
power is implicit in the statement that it is to be used in
the implementation of federal policy. Federal policy, of
course, is not compounded of judicial prejudices. What constitutes federal policy is to be learned, rather, from the
Constitution, from treaties, from statutes, and from judicial
pronouncements. 15
The federal attitude respecting discriminatory practices
in the selection of jurors was unmistakably laid down in
the Civil Rights Act. 6 The clear intention of the framers
of that statute was that no one should be deliberately excluded from jury service on account of his race or color.
The policy underlying the Civil Rights Act was clearly disregarded in the instant case. Here, then, was an opportunity
for the court to vindicate the principles of that legislation
13. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340 (1943).
14. 318 U. S. 332 (1943). In the McNabb case there was introduced
in evidence a-confession obtained after ten days interrogation of defendants who had not been brought before a United States Commissioner or judicial officer. Reasoning that the conduct of the arresting and interrogating officers was a violation of various statutory
commands requiring immediate presentment before a committing
officer, the Court held that the conviction would not stand on such
evidence, "quite apart from Constitution." Id. at 341. In view
of the explicit command of the Civil Rights Act, note 15 infra,
the argument for reversal in the instant case seems fully as
strong as that which decided the Court in the McNabb case.
15. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 35 (1948); Muschany v. United
States, 324 U. S. 49, 66 (1945).
16.

"No citizen possessing all other qualifications . . . prescribed by

law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any
court of the United States, or of any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other
person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning
of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for
the cause aforesaid shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor. . .

."

18 STAT. 336 (1875),

8 U. S. C. § 44

(1946). The constitutionality of these words of the Civil Rights
Act was upheld in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880).
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by declaring that the conduct of the United States attorney
was inconsistent with federal policy.
If the device of which the United States attorney made
use in the instant case is not to become a discriminatory tool
in the hands of the state prosecutors 7 it must be shown that
not federal policy alone but the Fourteenth Amendment as
well proscribes its use. A consideration of the limits imposed by that Amendment has importance not only because
it will reveal the extent of permissible action by state courts;
it will also disclose the minimum standards which federal
courts, including the court in the instant case, must maintain. For, in the second of the Restrictive Covenant Cases,
decided last Term, the United States Supreme Court announced flatly that conduct which is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is, without
more, in contravention of the public policy of the United
States'8 It follows then that if the present use of the peremptory challenge would constitute a deprivation of equal
protection in the state courts its use in the federal courts
is not to be permitted.
From a series of cases in which the United States Supreme Court was called upon to determine the constitutionality of state jury selection systems where there was evidence that deliberate exclusion of Negroes from the panels
was being practiced, this doctrine has emerged: In cases
involving Negro defendants, where such systematic exclusion
is sufficiently shown, convictions -will not be allowed to
stand, inasmuch as discriminatory methods of jury panel
selection operate to deny to defendants equal protection of
the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment." Although the
Supreme Court decisions respecting the state practices were
concerned primarily with discrimination in the selection of
the jury panel, the prohibition of systematic exclusion embodied in them cannot be limited to the precise fact situa17. In several cases before state courts, use of the peremptory challenge as in the instant case withstood attacks upon its constitutionality. Watkins v. State, 199 Ga. 81, 33 S. E.2d 325 (1945);
Whitney v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. R. 197, 63 S. W. 879 (1901);
accord, People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575, 12 N. W.2d 466
(1943), cert denied sub nom. Roxborough v. Michigan, 323 U. S.
749 (1944); see State v. Logan, 344 Mo. 351, 353, 126 S. W.2d
256, 258 (1939).
18. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24, 35 (1948).
19. Cases cited note 3 supra.
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tions of those cases. The discrimination there condemned
had as its goal the exclusion of Negroes from the jury itself
and the proscription of discrimination in the selection of a
panel was intended to protect not simply the integrity of the
panel but of the jury itself. There is implicit in those decisions an intention to prevent discrimination of any type
in the process leading to the final seating of the twelve
jurors who are to try the case. 20 The novelty of the discriminatory device employed in the present case should deceive no court into the belief that the constitutional inhibition
of the "selection of the panel" cases is so narrow as not to
bring within its sweep any other method of discrimination
which arrives at the same end, viz., the exclusion of Negroes
from a jury trying a Negro.
The court in the instant case recognized the vitality of
the constitutional doctrine which grounded the "selection of
the panel" cases. However, concern for the preservation
of the peremptory challenge in all its historical vigor moved
the court to refrain from disturbing the convictions below.
The majority pointed out that since a peremptory challenge
is used in the rejection of jurors and not in their selection,
it necessairly follows that misuse of the challenge could not
be a violation of the injunction of the United States Supreme
Court against discriminatory practices in the selection of
the panel. Although this distinction has valid and useful
application in certain types of cases,2 1 it is exposed as a
20.

This is a conclusion which must result from the pronouncements
of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that in determining whether or not there has been a denial of a federal right,
the Court will not be satisfied with a showing that there has
been no express denial, but will seek to find if there has been a
deprivation of the right in substance and effect. See Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 590 (1935).
See also the language of
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous Court in Patton v.
Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463, 465-466 (1947): "Sixty-seven years
ago this Court held that state exclusion of Negroes from grand
and petit juries solely because of their race denied Negro defendants in criminal cases the equal protection of the laws required by the Fourteenth Amendment.

21.

.

.

. a long and unbroken

line of our decisions since then has reiterated that principle, regardless of whether the discrimination was embodied in statute
or was apparent from the administrative practices of state jury
selection officials, and regardless of whether the system for
depriving defendants of their rights was 'ingenious or ingenuous.'"
That ingenuity of the method selected to accomplish the discrimination will not protect it is stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 132 (1940).
Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164 (1905); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172 (1899); Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S.
396 (1894); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68 (1887).
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mere play on words when lifted out of its context and applied to an entirely different fact situation..2 2 Vital questions of constitutional right should not be made to turn upon
vocabulary distinctions. It is apparent that a court which
expressly prohibits discrimination in one phase of the formation of the jury, and yet allows the same sort of discriminatory exclusion to go unchecked in a later phase is involved
in a doctrinal inconsistency. What is more serious, the inconsistency is one which, if perpetuated, will effectively sabotage the structure of rights against discrimination in the
jury system which the United States Supreme Court has
erected out of its decisions in the "selection of the panel"
cases.
To the court's fears that a successful assault upon the
exercise of the peremptory challenge in the instant case
would destroy that procedural privilege, two answers may be
made. In the first place, the most inveterate rule of procedure must give way if its uninhibited operation is found
to embarrass the exercise of constitutionally safeguarded
rights.23 Secondly, the fear that the peremptory challenge,
as a procedural institution, would not survive a reversal in
the instant case can be shown to be groundless. On this
point the court concluded that to hold the actions of the
United States attorney to be a violation of due process would
be to deprive the prosecution of the privilege of peremptorily
challenging a Negro juror in any case involving a Negro defendant. This, it was said, would extend to members of the
Negro race a privilege not granted to the members of any
22.

In Marchant and Colson v. United States, 12 Wheat. 480 (U. S.

1827), which is the earliest case discovered setting forth this
"rule" which characterizes the peremptory challenge as a means

of rejection of jurors, the defendants, who were jointly indicted,

demanded separate trials on the ground that upon a joint trial,
a juror desired by one defendant might be challenged by another
and withdrawn as to all, thus impairing the asserted right to

select the jury from the panel. There it was proper for the court
to distinguish between selection and rejection, for it is clear that
an accused person does not have the right to select the individual
jurors whom he wishes to try him. He has merely the privilege
of rejecting a certain number of the members of the panel which

is presented him.
23. For example, notwithstanding the rule that fact finding is, in

jury cases, customarily the exclusive province of the jury, the

United States Supreme Court has reexamined findings of fact,
where *that was necessary to a determination of a question of
Constitutional right. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143,
148 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 237, 238 (1941);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 590 (1935).

270
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other race. It is true that an unqualified reversal in the
instant case might have that effect. However, had the court
closely considered the technique of the United States Supreme
Court in the "selection of the panel" cases, it would have
discerned a means whereby the discrimination evident in
the principal case might be prevented; a means, moreover,
which would effect no serious dilution of the efficacy of the
peremptory challenge.
Racial discrimination in the selection of the panel of
jurors has been established, in a number of cases considered
by the Supreme Court, in consequence of a showing by the
Negro defendants that the circumstances surrounding the
impaneling raise a strong inference that systematic exclusion
of Negroes has been practiced. 24

In building a record from

which only that inference can reasonably be drawn, the Negro
defendant submits evidence that for a number of years no
colored person has been called for jury duty. If that evidence is sufficient to show that chance or accident could not
account for the absence of Negroes from the panels, the inference of discrimination is drawn, and a prima facie case
for the reversal of a conviction is made out. This inference
of discrimination may, of course, be explained away upon
a showing by the prosecution that factors other than racial
antipathy operated to exclude Negroes from the jury. The
fact that in the "selection of the panel" cases the evidence
adduced by the defendant must show that discrimination
has taken place over a period of years, while in the instant
situation the inquiry is restricted to the presence of discrimination in one particular case, makes it obvious that the
formula used in the former type case can not be transplanted
intact from that area to this one. What is suggested is that
the basic approach of the "panel" cases-that is, the factual
approach which seeks to discover the presence of intentional
exclusion-is adaptable to and useful in the present sort of
case. In the. instant circumstances, the following elements
would have relevance in building the case for the Negro defendant: (1) the number of Negroes appearing on the panel;
(2) the number of impaneled Negroes peremptorily challenged; (3) the number of non-Negro veniremen peremptorily
24.

Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Tekas, 316 U.
S. 400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.

370 (1881).
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challenged; (4) and the proportion of Negroes challenged
to the total number of jurors challenged. 25 Here, as in the
"selection of the panel" cases, these numerical factors are
significant, not in themselves, but only insofar as, if unexplained, they negative any inference other than that of deliberate discrimination.
The instant case presents the situation in which the test
proposed has obvious results. It must be conceded that
marginal cases might arise, in which the facts would not be
conclusive in favor of the inference or against it. In such
cases, the defendant's attack must fail. The same observation might be made respecting the formula used in the "selection of the panel" cases; but, the fact that the United
States Supreme Court has propounded and reiterated the
formula indicates that the Court regards the device, whatever its inadequacies, as a useful one. At the least it is an
attempt to get at the facts and is superior to logomachy, such
as that indulged in by the court in the instant case.
It may be argued that the characterization of the problem of the instant case as a constitutional question leads to
the imposition upon the courts of the duty of reviewing all
such cases. It might be urged that in many cases in which
there is in the use of the peremptory challenge the slightest
tinge of discrimination against any class, the losing party
may make a plausible argument to the effect that he has
suffered at the trial stage a deprivation of his constitutional
rights. This, the argument will run, will vex the courts with
an intolerable administrative burden. In two ways, however,
it may be shown that the remedy proposed will have a
limited operation, and will yet retain its effectiveness in the
instant circumstances. First: The test suggested is framed
in terms so restrictive that an application of it to a case
greatly unlike the present one is difficult to suppose. The
formula which is here proposed was conceived as an answer
to a scheme for racial discrimination. It is carefully drawn
to meet that problem only. Even if it be granted that the
test has possible application in other Negro cases, the nar25. A prosecutor, bent on discriminatory exclusion, could "take out
insurance" against a subsequent reversal by peremptorily challenging a decent number of white veniremen after having removed
the Negroes from the panel. To meet such a maneuver, courts
should be conditioned against giving too much weight to factors
(3) and (4) of the proposed test.
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rowness of the terms in which it is drawn insures that its
adoption would not lead to a deluging of the courts with
appeals for resolution of cases involving this "new" constitutional question. Second: There is a further indication that
the test proposed, if adopted, would be made use of only in
cases closely paralleling, factually, the instant one. This
indication is to be found in the attitude which the Supreme
Court has taken in jury cases where discrimination of a
non-racial type has been the issue. The Court has looked
to the Civil Rights Act, one portion of which makes it a crime
for any officer of a state or federal court to exclude persons
from jury service on account of race or color. 28 In consequence of this special legislative treatment, it is said, the
cases involving the exclusion of Negroes from juries are considered as in a class by themselves. 27 It should follow that
the present problem-which is only a facet of the large one
with which the Civil Rights Act and the precedents dealand its solution will be considered as concerning only the
fact-pattern of the instant case. This analysis limits the
applicability of the proposed formula to racial cases. Of
those cases, some would be disposed of at once as raising no
substantial question under the test. The objection that
adoption of the proposed solution would overburden the
courts becomes an illusory one.
It cannot be said that a reversal framed in the terms
suggested makes no provision for the case in which the prosecutor in good faith believes that he cannot obtain a fair trial
if the jury which is finally seated includes Negroes. The
challenge for cause would continue to be available. Although
a challenge for cause can not easily be made to "stick," its
availability insures that the prosecution can remove from
the jury those Negro veniremen whom it finds to be genuinely prejudiced.
26.
27.

18 STAT. 336 (1875); 8 U. S. C. § 44 (1946).
See Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 282, 283 (1947).
The uniqueness of the cases which have developed this aspect
of the Civil Rights Act has led -to this practical result: A defendant claiming that there was discrimination against his race in the
impaneling of the jury need not show that he was harmed
thereby. The discrimination alone denies him equal protection.
But, if the discrimination claimed is other than racial, the defendant assumes the burden of showing that it operated to deprive him of a fair trial. Cf. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638
(1906).

